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1 The panel took place at the A.B.A.’s 29th National
Conference on Professional Responsibility. See A.B.A. CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, COURSEBOOK FOR 29TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 667 (Chicago, May 31, 2003)
[hereinafter COURSEBOOK].
2 See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of
Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 330-52 (1998) (discussing the
criminal law’s applicability to lawyers and its interaction
with professional regulation); Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer
Crimes: Beyond the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 73, 79-91 (2001)
(analyzing when, if ever, lawyers’ professional activities are
“beyond the law”).
3 See, e.g., S.E.C. v. National Student Marketing Corp.,
457 F.Supp. 682, 700 (D.D.C. 1978) (charging lawyers with
securities law violations for issuing opinion letters that
bolstered their clients’ S.E.C. filings); see also DAVID
WEISBURD, ET AL, CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 53-58 (1991) (sample
study revealing 14 instances of securities law prosecutions of
attorneys); Kenneth F. Krach, The Client-Fraud Dilemma: A Need
for Consensus, 46 MD. L. REV. 436, 461 (1987) (discussing
further securities cases filed against lawyers after National
1
This essay was written in connection with a panel
discussion entitled “The Layering of Ethics Rules: The Federal
Government’s Increasing Regulation of a Lawyer’s Activities.”1
The premise of the panel – a correct premise – was that
federal lawmakers increasingly have taken actions that
contradict, interfere with, or preempt state regulation of
lawyers. Most of the commentary regarding the recent federal
actions has focused on whether individual regulations are
substantively justified. This essay takes a more global look
at the phenomenon of increasing federal regulation and asks
whether it is symptomatic of changing views of appropriate
professional regulation. Stated differently, the essay will
consider how the new trend relates to general themes in
professional regulation as a whole.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF LAWYER ACTIVITY
Federal laws always have governed the practice of law.
Criminal prohibitions, for example, apply to lawyers in the
same way that they apply to private citizens.2 Lawyers are
bound by securities regulation,3 money laundering statutes,4
3
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Student Marketing).
4 See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act of (RICO) 18 U.S.C. §§1961-68 (making it unlawful for any
person to use income derived from racketeering in any activity
that affects interstate commerce); 21 U.S.C. §853(c)
(rendering property involved in or generated by the commission
of a crime and subsequently transferred to a third party –
including a lawyer – subject to a special verdict of
forfeiture); 18 U.S.C. §982 (providing for forfeiture of
assets derived by money laundering under 18 U.S.C. §§1956,
1957, 1960); id. (requiring reporting of specified financial
transactions); United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir.
1995) (upholding a lawyer’s conviction for failure to report
cash payments under federal money-laundering statute); see
also United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989) (upholding
the constitutionality of a statute authorizing freezing and
forfeiture of assets transferred to any person, including
lawyers); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491
U.S. 617 (1989) (same).
5 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §2 (imposing principal liability on
aiders and abettors); 18 U.S.C. §371 (criminalizing
conspiracies to commit an offense); United States v.
Arrington, 719 F. 2d 701 (4th Cir. 1983) (upholding conviction
of attorney for aiding and abetting conspiracy to receive and
sell stolen property in interstate commerce); United States v.
Kaplan, 832 F. 2d 676 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding attorney’s
conviction for aiding and abetting mail fraud); United States
v. Feaster, 1988 WL 33814 (6th Cir. 1988) (upholding a
lawyer’s conviction for aiding an undercover agent in
preparing a false tax return); United States v. Cueto, 151
F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding a lawyer’s conviction for
conspiracy to defraud the government). 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Zeman, 1992 U.S.App. Lexis
29842 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding a lawyer’s conviction for
witness tampering); United States v. Bronson, 658 F.2d 920,
922 (2d Cir. 1981)(upholding a lawyer’s conviction for mail
fraud); United States v. Zicchettello, 208 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.
2000)(upholding a lawyer’s conviction for a criminal RICO
violation); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.
1987) (upholding a lawyer’s conviction for obstruction of
2
aiding and abetting and conspiracy laws,5 and others.6
4
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justice).
7 In Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 335 (1994), I analyze whether that history should be
abandoned, in favor of a federalized code of professional
responsibility.
8 The history of state regulation of lawyers is detailed
in Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client
Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1315-16 (1995).
9 Federal court regulation may or may not be endorsed by
Congress. See Fred C. Zacharias and Bruce A. Green, Federal
Court Regulation of Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory,
___ VAND. L. REV. ___, ___ (2003) (identifying and analyzing the
assertion of power by federal courts to regulate lawyers’
professional conduct); see also Fed R. Civ. P. Rule 11
(imposing duties on lawyers in federal civil matters that
parallel, but to some extent conflict with, state professional
rules); 28 U.S.C. §1927 (2003) (authorizing federal courts to
order payment of fees and costs by lawyers who “unreasonably
and vexatiously” prolong federal proceedings). 
10 See authorities cited in Zacharias and Green, supra
note 9 at ___.
11 Some long-standing federal regulation of lawyer
practice exists, including federal regulation of the patent,
trademark, and bankruptcy bars. More recently, other federal
agencies – including the Veterans Administration, Department
of Interior, Department of Health and Human Services, and
Treasury Department – also have adopted general rules
regulating lawyers who appear before them. Some of the
pertinent regulations are collected in COURSEBOOK, supra note 1,
3
Traditionally, however, the specific regulation of law
practice has been the prerogative of the states.7 Professional
codes are state creations.8 Although federal district courts
have assumed some leeway to adopt their own rules of practice
for federal litigation,9 even they for the most part have
followed the rules governing lawyers in the states within
their jurisdictions.10
Efforts by federal agencies to exert control over state
professional mandates therefore are a relatively new
phenomenon.11 There have been numerous significant developments
5
Zacharias:
Published by Digital USD, 2004
at 669-708. 
12 The details of O.T.S.’s implementation of these
regulations against the Kaye Scholer law firm can be found in
Joyce A. Hughes, Law Firm Kaye, Scholer, Lincoln S&L and the
OTS, 7 NOTRE DAME J. OF L., ETHICS, & PUB. POL. 177 (1993); see
also authorities cited infra notes 14-16.
13 12 C.F.R. §563.18(b) (1988) (currently 12 C.F.R.
§563.180(b)(1)) (providing that no affiliated person shall
knowingly “[m]ake any written or oral statement to the Office
or to an agent, representative or employee of the Office that
is false or misleading with respect to any material fact or
omits to state a material fact concerning any matter within
the jurisdiction of the Office”). The Financial Institution
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183, which followed Kaye, Scholer, expressly amended
the definition of affiliated person to include lawyers. 12
U.S.C. §1813(u)(4).
14 Attorneys Can't Claim Privilege as Agents of Their
Clients, OTS' Chief Counsel Argues, BANKING ATT'Y (BNA), May 25,
1992, at 5; OTS Chief General Counsel Defends Action Against
Kaye, Scholer, 8 ABA/BNA LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT 77 (Apr. 8,
1992); see also Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New
Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervision,
and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S.C. L. REV. 985, 991-96
4
on this front in the last two decades alone – ranging from
narrow efforts to impose specific obligations upon lawyers
that arguably are consistent with existing legal ethics codes
to broader efforts to supplant state rules altogether.
One of the first developments involved the Office of
Thrift Supervision’s application to lawyers of regulations
governing mandatory submissions to the agency by banking
institutions.12 Under these regulations, banking institutions
were required to submit “nonmisleading information.”13 After
lawyers for the Kaye, Scholer law firm, in typical advocate’s
fashion, filed papers on behalf of a regulated client that
stretched the truth, O.T.S. sought a recovery from the law
firm on the grounds that it had acted as the client’s agent
(and was therefore bound by requirements governing the client)
and that it had aided and abetted the client in violating the
regulation.14 In a complicated set of events that will not be
6
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 21 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art21
(1993)(discussing O.T.S.’s claims); Peter C. Kostant, When
Zeal Boils Over: Disclosure Obligations and the Duty of Candor
of Legal Counsel in Regulatory Proceedings after the Kaye
Scholer Settlement, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 487, 521-27 (1993)
(highlighting the government’s perspective); James Podgers,
Kaye Scholer: The Tremors Continue Part II: Changing the
Rules, 78 A.B.A. J. 53 (1992)(describing O.T.S.’s position);
Charles R. Zubrzycki, Note, The Kaye, Scholer Case: Attorneys'
Ethical Duties To Third Parties In Regulatory Situations, 6
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 977, 978-80 (1993)(outlining the
government’s charges).
15 Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS, Kaye Scholer Agree
to Settle all Charges, OTS NEWS 92-95 (Mar. 8, 1992).
16 Numerous commentators have described O.T.S.’s
regulation as undermining lawyers’ traditional duties to
maintain client confidences and to advocate their client’s
positions in a partisan fashion. See, e.g., Anthony E. Davis,
The Long Term Implications of the Kaye Scholer Case for Law
Firm Management – Risk Management Comes of Age, 35 S. TEX. L.
REV. 677, 682 (1994) (discussing the implications of O.T.S.’s
actions); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye Scholer:
Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial
Institutions, 66 S.C. L. REV. 1019, 1049 (1993)(analyzing the
effect of O.T.S.’s approach in designating lawyers as
gatekeepers against client misconduct); W. Frank Newton, A
Lawyer’s Duty to the Legal System and to a Client Drawing the
Line, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 701, 705 (1994) (criticizing the
government’s position); Nancy J. Valerio, Developments in
Banking Law, 1993: Professional Responsibility, 13 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 11, 19-20 (1994) (reporting the opposition of an
A.B.A. working group to O.T.S.’s position); cf. George C.
Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability
for Failure to Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients through
Disclosures of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
597, 619 (1998) (discussing the implications of the Kaye,
5
detailed here, the case ultimately was settled.15 The important
point for our purposes is that O.T.S. succeeded in imposing
responsibilities on banking lawyers that differed from, and in
some respects seemed inconsistent with, their responsibilities
under traditional state codes.16
7
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Scholer case in light of the limited case law defining the
role lawyers must adopt). That is not to say the O.T.S.
position was wrong. The Kaye, Scholer lawyers were acting as
their client’s agents in submitting filings to the agency. The
claims of critics notwithstanding, nothing in state
professional codes authorizes lawyers to commit illegal acts
or to enable clients to commit illegal acts simply by acting
in the clients’ place. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Kaye
Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the Bar’s
Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQ. 243, 251
(1998) (arguing that commentators critical of the O.T.S.
position have failed to analyze it fairly); David B. Wilkins,
Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers after Kaye, Scholer,
66 S.C. L. REV. 1145, 1150 (1993)(arguing for a contextual
approach to legal ethics); Fred C. Zacharias, The Restatement
and Confidentiality, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 73, 85 (1993)   (“The
bank's choice of a lawyer to represent it in making legally
required responses may justify the government in viewing the
lawyer more as the bank's alter ego than its legal advocate”.
17 See Edward Adams, Thrift Litigation Fallout; Suits
Increasing; Firm Grip on Lawyers Sought, N.Y. L.J. (June 18,
1992), at 5 (referring to Kaye, Scholer-type lawsuits brought
by the Resolution Trust Corporation and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation against law firms in five states).
Under authority granted by 31 U.S.C. §5318(g), the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the
Treasury (FinCEN) adopted reporting requirements that obligate
financial institutions to report any suspicious transaction
possibly related to a violation of law or regulation. 61 Fed.
Reg. 4326 (February 5, 1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 4338 (February 5,
1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 4332 (February 5, 1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 6095
(February 16, 1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 6100 February 16, 1996); 61
Fed. Reg. 11526 (March 21, 1996). In partnership with FinCEN,
several banking regulators adopted the suspicious activity
reporting requirements into their own regulations. See 12
C.F.R. §563.180(d) (2003) (O.T.S. regulations requiring
savings associations and service corporations under specified
circumstances to file suspicious activity reports with the
appropriate Federal law enforcement agencies and the
6
After the highly publicized Kaye, Scholer settlement,
other federal agencies adopted and enforced similar
regulations.17 Commentators have suggested that more will
8
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Department of the Treasury by sending a completed report to
FinCEN); accord 12 C.F.R. §208.62 (2003) (Federal Reserve
regulations); 12 C.F.R. §21.11 (2003) (Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency regulations); 12 C.F.R. §353.3
(2003) (F.D.I.C. regulations); 12 C.F.R. §748.1 (2003)
(National Credit Union Administration regulations). These
regulations extend the reporting duty to affiliated
individuals defined in 12 U.S.C. §1813(u)(4), including
lawyers.
18 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §292.3(a)(3) (Immigration and
Naturalization Service regulation forbidding lawyers to
mislead or deceive an officer of the Department of Justice);
see also Jill Evans, The Lawyer as Enlightened Citizen:
Towards A New Regulatory Model in Environmental Law, 24 VT. L.
REV. 229, 230-31 (2000) (arguing that environmental statutes
give the E.P.A. authority to adopt regulations that will turn
lawyers into gatekeepers for their client’s environmental
activities).
19 31 C.F.R. §10.34(a) (1994).
20 See generally 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2003).
21 E.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT,
Rule 3.8(f) (1990) (subsequently amended in 1995) [hereinafter
7
follow.18
The Internal Revenue Service has promulgated a different
form of regulation that focuses even more directly on the
lawyer’s role as advocate. The regulation limits the positions
lawyers may take when appearing before the I.R.S. to those
that have “a realistic possibility of being sustained on
[their] merits,”19 even when other positions would be deemed
non-frivolous for purposes of traditional professional rules.
Although this and other aspects of I.R.S. regulations
governing the practice of tax attorneys20 seem like a dramatic
preemption of state ethics codes, they have never been highly
publicized except among tax practitioners and professional
responsibility scholars – probably because the regulations
apply to such a narrow field of practice.
Far more controversial have been the severely criticized
attempts by the American Bar Association and state regulators
to adopt or apply rules restricting prosecutors’ ability to
subpoena attorneys21 and to communicate with represented
9
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“Model Rules”. See generally Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between
the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1399-1401 (1992)
(discussing the controversy over Model Rule 3.8(f) and arguing
that the controversy reflected the bar’s normative vision of
how the law should apply to lawyers). The A.B.A. first
suggested reform in 1986 and 1988. See ABA, Resolution on
Attorney Subpoenas (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter 1988 A.B.A.
Resolution], reprinted in Max D. Stern & David Hoffman,
Privileged informers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem and a
Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1853-54 (1988);
ABA, Resolution on Subpoenaing Attorneys Before the Grand Jury
(Feb. 1986) [hereinafter 1986 A.B.A. Resolution], reprinted in
Stern & Hoffman, supra, at 1852. The 1988 Resolution
strengthened the 1986 Resolution and expanded the rule’s
application to all prosecutorial attempts to obtain lawyer
testimony relating to representation of a client’s affairs,
before grand juries or elsewhere. A version of Model Rule
3.8(f) tracking the 1988 proposal was adopted in 1990 but,
after litigation, negotiation, and further deliberation, was
amended in 1995 so as to delete the requirement that
prosecutors obtain “prior judicial approval after an
opportunity for an adversarial hearing” before issuing
attorney-subpoenas.
22 E.g., Model Rules, Rule 4.2 (1983); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-104 (1969); see
Neals-Erik W. Delker, Comment, Ethics and the Federal
Prosecutor: The Continuing Conflict over the Application of
Model Rule 4.2 to Federal Attorneys, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 855,
858-59 (1995)(noting disagreement about the appropriate scope
of professional no-contact rules); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules
of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court
and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460,
470-72 (1996) (discussing the history of no-contact
regulation); cf. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in
Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the
Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 269
n.134 (1993) (citing commentary that assumes that prosecutors
are, and should be, bound to the same rules as other lawyers).
8
parties,22 and the equally severely criticized response by the
10
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23 The controversy is described in detail in Fred C.
Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal
Prosecutors; Or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 429-30 (1996); see also Corinna B. Lain,
Prosecutorial Ethics Under the Reno Rule: Authorized by Law?,
14 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 17, 22-24 (1995) (criticizing the Reno Rule
Rule’s impact on prosecutorial ethics as having “the fox
guarding the chicken coop”); Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork
Orange Approach to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on
the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 473, 494 (1995) (noting that "the DOJ's new rule takes
the concept of attorney self-regulation to the most extreme
manifestation imaginable").
24 Hereinafter, the Department of Justice sometimes is
referred to as “D.O.J.”.
25 Richard L. Thornburgh, "Memorandum from Attorney
General to all Justice Department Litigators" 1 (June 8,
1989), reprinted in Matter of Doe, 801 F.Supp. 478, 489
(D.N.M. 1992). The Justice Department's decision to claim
authority to preempt state regulation stemmed from the
D.O.J.'s reaction to the rules governing attorney subpoenas
and contacts with represented persons that, in effect, limited
the investigative power of federal prosecutors.
26 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.1-77.2 (1995). The history of the
D.O.J. Regulations is discussed in Zacharias, supra note 23,
at 429 nns. 1-2.
27 59 Fed. Reg. 10,086, 10,088 (March 3, 1994)(“Department
attorneys continue to be subject to state bar ethical rules
where they are licensed to practice, except in the limited
circumstances where state ethical rules clearly conflict with
lawful federal procedures and practices”).
9
federal Department of Justice.23 During the first Bush
administration, in the so-called “Thornburgh Memorandum,” the
Department of Justice24 purported to preempt the application of
all state professional rules to federal attorneys.25 The
Clinton Administration moderated this approach, acknowledging
in formal regulations that most state rules should apply.26 But
it reserved the right to preempt particular rules that
interfere with federal law enforcement.27 These regulations,
known as the “Reno Rule”, specifically excepted D.O.J.
11
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28 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.12 (1995).
29 See Citizens Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §530B (1998)
(applying state ethics rules to federal attorneys); 28 C.F.R.
§§77.1-77.3 (2003) (implementing the McDade Amendment).
30 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, §307, 116
Stat. 745 (2002).
31 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, No. S7-45-02, Securities Act Release No. 33-8150,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-46868 (Nov. 21, 2002) (“Outside
attorneys who . . . have not received an appropriate response
and who reasonably believe that the reported material
violation is ongoing or is about to occur and is likely to
result in substantial injury to the financial interest of the
issuer or of investors are required to withdraw from the
representation, notify the Commission of their withdrawal, and
disaffirm any submission to the Commission that they have
participated in preparing which is tainted by the violation.
In-house attorneys . . . are required to disaffirm any tainted
submission they have participated in preparing, but are not
required to resign.”) [hereinafter “Proposed Rule”].
32 Comments submitted to the S.E.C. that fitted this mold
included: Comments of Gerald S. Backman, Chairman, Securities
Regulation Comm., Bus. Law Section, N.Y.S. Bar Ass’n, at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/gesbackman1.htm (Dec.
10
attorneys from the application of state no-contact
provisions.28 The Reno Rule subsequently was superceded by the
McDade Amendment.29
More recently, pursuant to federal legislation adopted
after the Enron and WorldCom scandals,30 the S.E.C. promulgated
a series of regulations governing securities attorneys. The
initially-proposed regulations emphasized the role of lawyers
as gatekeepers of client misconduct. They required securities
lawyers to take remedial steps upon learning of potential
wrongdoing by clients and required the lawyers to withdraw and
report to the S.E.C when clients decline to respond to the
remedial measures in a satisfactory manner.31 The bar – led by
the A.B.A. and state bar organizations – responded
vociferously that these proposed regulations undermined both
attorney-client confidentiality and the traditional role of
lawyers under state professional codes.32 In a gesture of
12
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18, 2002) (voicing concern the proposed rules would undermine
the attorney-client relationship and chill attorney-client
communications); Comments of Jennifer T. Nijman, Pres.,
Chicago Bar Ass’n, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s74502/ jtnijman1.htm (Dec. 18, 2002) (arguing that the
proposals would erode client confidence in their attorneys and
that would make attorneys reluctant to learn about their
client’s activities); Comments of Alfred P. Carlton, Jr.,
A.B.A. Pres.,
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarlton1.htm
(Dec. 18, 2002) (arguing that the proposals create a conflict
between the attorney’s interest and the client’s); see also
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, No. S7-45-02, Securities Act Releases No. 33-8186,
34-47282 (Jan. 29, 2003) (discussing critical comments
submitted to the S.E.C.); Brian P. Kane, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002: Something For Everyone to Worry About, 45 ADVOCATE
16 (2002) (concluding that “Congress crossed the Rubicon with
the American Bar Association by taking a direct swipe at the
revered attorney-client privilege); Tamara Loomis, 77 Big
Firms Attack SEC Bid to Force Revealing Client Secrets, 113
FULTON CTY. DAILY REP. NO. 246 (12/20/02) (reporting critical
comments filed by 77 law firms concerning the Sarbanes-Oxley
regulations); see also Letter dated April 7, 2003, from
American Corporate Counsel Association to the S.E.C.,
http://www.acca.com/advocacy/ 307comments2.pdf, p.2.(arguing
that the S.E.C. reporting requirements “may cause currently
healthy lawyer-client relationships irreparable harm”).
33 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, No. S7-45-02, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47276, at *1-2 (Jan. 29, 2003)
(noting deferral of implementation and stating “We are still
considering the ‘noisy withdrawal’ provisions of our original
proposal under section 307”) [hereinafter “Final Rule].
11
compromise, the S.E.C. ultimately adopted somewhat less
forceful regulations – still requiring remedial measures by
some securities attorneys in some circumstances, but
postponing for future consideration the “noisy withdrawal”
proposal.33
One final set of federal rules that might interfere with
traditional state regulation is currently being considered. In
an effort to fight terrorism in the wake of the September 11
attacks, Congress adopted measures to counteract money
13
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34 U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001).
35 The Act does specify “persons engaging in real estate
closings and settlements,” but the pertinent regulatory bodies
have delayed defining that term. See Kevin L. Shepherd, USA
Patriot Act and the Gatekeeper Initiative: Surprising
Implications for Transactional Lawyers, 16 PROB. & PROP. 26, 30
(2002) (describing developments relating to the Gatekeeper
Initiative).
36 Cf. Bruce Zagaris, Gatekeepers Initiative: Seeking
Middle Ground between Client and Government, 16 CRIM. JUST. 26,
30 (2002) (discussing obligations that may arise for
accountants and lawyers in assisting clients in performing
“due diligence”).
37 I.e., the Financial Action Task Force.
38 Shepherd, supra note 35, at 27 (describing FATF’s
work).
39ABA Delegates Vote Opposition to Proposals to Make
Attorneys Report Shady Transactions, 19 ABA/BNA LAWS. MAN. ON
PROF. CONDUCT 99 (Feb. 12, 2003); see also Zagaris, supra note
36, at 29 (noting that “the chief of the asset forfeiture and
money-laundering section of the Department of Justice is
reviewing the professional responsibilities of attorneys and
accountants with regard to money laundering and will make
12
laundering by requiring financial institutions to report
particular transactions and to take other preventive
measures.34 Except for lawyers who are members of such
institutions, neither this legislation nor regulations adopted
to date specifically target lawyers.35 However, lawyers
probably are responsible for avoiding any aiding or abetting
of violations of the Act.36 
More significantly, FATF37, an international policymaking
body, is studying a proposal that lawyers and other
professionals be enlisted as “gatekeepers” against client
money-laundering activity – the so-called “Gatekeeper
Initiative.”38 FATF is expected to issue its recommendations
and the U.S. Government is expected to “craft a formal
position on the gatekeeper responsibilities for lawyers”
within the year.39 The A.B.A. has established a task force that
14
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recommendations as needed”) and authorities cited therein.
40 Id.
41 The Thornburgh memorandum focused only on the
applicability of state professional codes to federal
Department of Justice attorneys engaged in their official
prosecutorial duties. See Thornburgh, supra note 25.
42 Thus, for example, the the O.T.S. regulations focused
on lawyers filing banking statements, the Sarbanes-Oxley
regulations focus on the specific activities of securities
lawyers practicing before the S.E.C., and the Gatekeeper
Initiative focuses on lawyers’ participation in money
laundering and terrorist activities.
13
has already taken a position opposing any proposals that would
require lawyers to disclose confidential information to the
government or otherwise “compromise the lawyer client
relationship or the independence of the bar.”40
Two conclusions seem clear from these developments.
First, the recent federal regulations are historically
distinctive. They reflect a growing willingness on the part of
federal actors to invade what previously was viewed as a state
regulatory prerogative. Second, none of the federal
initiatives reflects a broad attempt to supplant state
regulation across the board. Even the Thornburgh memorandum
limited itself to the regulation of specific activities of a
limited number of federal attorneys.41 The other initiatives
focused narrowly on a particular, confined aspect of legal
practice.42
The remainder of this essay considers how these
developments interact with, and what they signify for, broad
themes in lawyer regulation. It leaves the normative issues
aside – whether each of the federal regulations is justified
or not, whether it is legally authorized, and whether it
properly invades state power. Instead, the essay focuses on
the larger questions of whether and how the increase in
federal regulation as a whole might be explained in light of
traditional ways of looking at professional regulation.
II. FEDERALISM
At one level, the new efforts to regulate lawyers with
respect to federal activities – that is, representation before
federal agencies – may simply reflect a developing vision of
15
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43 Cf. E. Norman Veasey, Issues of Federalism in Light of
the SEC Final Rules Under Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 14 PROF’L LAWY. 26 (2002) (noting “interesting questions of
sweep, breadth, and federalism” raised by the Sarbanes-Oxley
rules). 
44 See authorities cited supra note 16 (discussing critics
and defenders of the O.T.S. approach).
45 As noted in Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and
Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and
False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV.829, 831 n.6 (2002), however, identifying a single role
for lawyers may be more important at times when lawyers have
no common conception of their functions, but may be less
14
federalism: federal agencies regulate federal practice, states
regulate local practice.43 That vision explains the Office of
Thrift Supervision’s limited requirements governing lawyer
submission of filings to the agency. Likewise, it accounts
fully for the I.R.S.’s insistence that tax lawyers screen the
positions they take before the Service.
There are both practical and philosophical reasons,
however, why the federalism divide is problematic as an
explanation for when federal regulations are justified and
when they are not. One can separate federal from state
practice only at a very elemental level. Direct presentations
to federal agencies, such as federal filings and appearances
in federal proceedings, seem federal rather than state in
nature. But the giving of legal advice preceding these actions
is not so easily classified. Indeed, when lawyers represent
clients with respect to conduct that is regulated by both
state and federal agencies or with respect to legal action
that can be filed in both state and federal venues, the
lawyers may not always be able to identify which kind of
practice they are engaging in at a particular moment.
More significantly, to the extent that the federal and
state regulation of lawyers prescribe different roles for
lawyers and different attorney-client relationships, one set
of regulations can undermine the other. Rightly or wrongly,
for example, the Office of Thrift Supervision rule was
criticized as undermining the lawyer’s sense of identity as a
zealous advocate.44 Arguably, a professional code of conduct
needs to establish a single role that lawyers and clients can
understand and implement across the board.45
16
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important when all lawyers share a general approach to
representation.
46 It is these rules that the D.O.J. purported to preempt
in the Thornburgh memorandum and then, in more muted form, in
the Reno Rule. See text accompanying note 25.
47 Admittedly, one can craft evidentiary rules that
exclude tainted evidence, or not, based on whether a
prosecution is state or federal. But that does not eliminate
the dilemma of how the state and federal lawyers directing the
investigating team should structure the joint federal-state
investigation. The decisions of state officials may taint
those of federal officials, and vice versa.
48 See Fred C. Zacharias, supra note 23, at 448-62
(discussing the interplay among the D.O.J., the A.B.A., and
state regulators).
49 See, e.g., Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53
F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding a local federal court
rule applying a state no-contact provision against federal
prosecutors); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st
Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that the Supremacy Clause does
15
The practical difficulty of separating state and federal
practice is best highlighted by the controversy surrounding
the application to federal prosecutors of state rules against
communicating with represented persons.46 The activity of
criminal suspects that might be subject to undercover
investigation often violates both state and federal law. On
occasion, such suspects are investigated jointly by state and
federal law enforcement teams. The application of no-contact
rules based on which agency ultimately prosecutes is thus
often impractical, because who will prosecute may not be clear
until the investigation is complete.47 Moreover, if one views
professional regulation through the lens of federalism, the
application of a state rule adopted with the support of the
local defense bar does seem to impinge on federal sovereignty.
This contradiction accounts both for the adoption of the
Thornburgh memorandum and the heated response by state
regulators.48
Interestingly, both the insistence of state regulators
that state no-contact rules should apply to federal
prosecutorial practice49 and the ultimate federal response,
17
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not bar enforcement of local federal court rules to federal
attorneys); see also Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution
XII, Proposed Rule Relating to Communications with Represented
Persons (Aug. 4, 1994) (opposing the Thornburgh Memorandum),
quoted and discussed in Daniel R. Coquillette, Report on Local
Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct in the Federal Courts in
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, SPECIAL STUDIES OF FEDERAL RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONDUCT 1, 35-
36 (1997) and Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic Theme:
Revisiting the ABA’s Revision of Model Rule 4.2, 70 TENN. L.
REV. 121, 125 n.7 (2002).
50 See text accompanying note 27.
51 See, e.g., Alafair S.R. Burke, Note, Reconciling
Professional Ethics and Prosecutorial Power: The No-Contact
Rule Debate, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1635, 1660-61 (1994) (arguing
that "the [federal] regulations intrude upon the attorney-
client relationship in ways unwarranted by the needs of
effective law enforcement”); Lain, supra note 23, at 17
(arguing against D.O.J.’s preemptive authority); Rory Little,
Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 362-63 & n.30 (1996) (noting "outraged bar
officials"); Jocelyn Lupert, Note, The Department of Justice
Rule Governing Communications with Represented Persons, 46
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1119, 1144-45 (1996) (cataloging the hostility
to the Reno Rule); Mashburn, supra note 23, at 495 (arguing
that the D.O.J. position lacked support in the case law or in
statutory authority).
52 See supra note 27.
53 Of course, the Department of Justice concessions, in
part, were politically driven. It is impossible to tell how
much politics or theoretical concerns drove the agency’s
conclusions.
16
agreeing in part,50 belie the existence of a developing
federalism approach to professional regulation. State
regulators and most commentators51 showed no inclination
whatsoever to cede the right of federal agencies to control
federal legal practice. Likewise, by agreeing that ordinarily
state rules should govern52, the Department of Justice seemed
to recognize that a clear state/federal divide is unworkable.53
18
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54 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was federal legislation that
required the S.E.C. to promulgate regulations to establish
“minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys who
appear and practice before the Commission” and to require
attorneys to report evidence of law violations, at least
within their corporations. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
107-204, §307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The S.E.C. initially
proposed regulations that contained a broad definition of
which lawyer activities were covered and called for
significant changes in the role of securities lawyers as
gatekeepers of client misconduct. See Proposed Rule, supra
note 31, at *25 (“[T]he proposed rule would adopt an expansive
view of who is appearing and practicing before the Commission
. . . . In addition to a rigorous “up the ladder” reporting
requirement, the proposed rule incorporates several corollary
provisions that are not explicitly required by Section 307 . .
. . Under certain circumstances, these provisions permit or
require attorneys to effect so-called ‘noisy withdrawal’ and
to notify the Commission that they have done so and permit
attorneys to report evidence of material violations to the
Commission . . . ”). Following a heated comment period, the
S.E.C. adopted a significantly weaker version of the original,
holding for further comment and consideration a requirement
that lawyers “noisily withdraw”, effectively informing the
S.E.C., when clients refuse to follow the lawyers’ insistence
that they comply more clearly with S.E.C. rules. See Final
Rule, supra note 33, at *5-7 (“[T]he final rule we adopt today
has been significantly modified in light of these comments and
suggestions”).
55 Proposed Rule, supra note 31, at *4 (“The purpose of
this release is to solicit comments on proposed Part 205,
which prescribes Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys who appear and practice before the Commission in any
way in the representation of issuers”).
17
The recently proposed, partially-adopted, and still open
Sarbanes-Oxley regulation of securities lawyers highlights
both the practical and philosophical weaknesses of the
federalism analysis. In their initial form,54 the S.E.C.
regulations proposed pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
applied to all lawyers who conduct business before the
S.E.C..55 This broad definition encompassed such lawyers even
though their work in the specific case at issue might not,
itself, be presented to the federal agency. The reason for the
19
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56 Id. at §205.3(b), at *75-76 (“If, in appearing and
practicing before the Commission . . . an attorney becomes
aware of evidence of a material violation by the issuer or by
any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer, the
attorney shall report any evidence of a material violation to
the issuer’s chief legal officer . . . or to both the issuer’s
chief legal officer and its chief executive officer”).
57 See Id. §205.3(d), at *125-126 (“Where an attorney . .
. does not receive an appropriate response . . . [he] shall
[w]ithdraw forthwith from representing the issuer . . . and
[w]ithin one business day of withdrawing, give written notice
to the Commission of the attorney’s withdrawal. . . and
[p]romptly disaffirm to the Commission any opinion . . . or
the like in a document filed with or submitted to the
Commission. . . that the attorney has prepared. . . and that
the attorney reasonably believes is or may be materially false
or misleading”) and Final Rule, supra note 33, at *1-2 (Jan.
29, 2003) (noting deferral the noisy withdrawal requirement
for further consideration).
58 See, e.g., Model Rules, Rule 1.13(b) (requiring a
lawyer for an organization to take remedial measures under
some circumstances, but giving the lawyer discretion as to
which measures are appropriate).
18
broad definition was clear: the ultimate presentation or use
of legal advice cannot always be determined at the time the
advice is given, so the agency chose to overinclude. Yet in
employing the broad definition, the proposed regulation
encompassed legal practice that would fall within the state
side of the federalism divide.
More significant was the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement that
lawyers sometimes report corporate wrongdoing56 and the
proposed regulatory requirement, currently held in abeyance,
that lawyers sometimes “noisily withdraw” from the
representation.57 These are inconsistent with most state rules
in two respects. First, state professional codes typically
phrase any reporting requirement governing corporate counsel
in permissive, rather than mandatory, terms.58 Second, absent
an actual misuse of a lawyer’s name, state codes typically
emphasize the preservation of client confidences over the
lawyer’s right or obligation to highlight the reasons for her
20
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59 See, e.g., id. cmt. (“this rule does not limit or
expand the lawyer’s responsibility under Rule 1.6 [requiring
confidentiality]”; CAL. R. PROF. CONDUCT, Rule 3-600(B),(C)
(emphasizing the corporate lawyer’s duty to protect “all
confidential information” and limiting her response to the
“right [or duty] to resign”).
60 Model Rule 3.3(b), which requires lawyers to disclose
confidential information when necessary to rectify certain
client frauds upon tribunals, does require lawyers to exercise
similar gatekeeping functions. The proposed Sarbanes-Oxley
regulations, however, extend the ability to blackmail the
client into complying with the lawyer’s directives to a far
broader array of advice and non-litigation contexts than the
Model Rules. cf. Model Rules, Rule 1.13(b) (requiring
corporate lawyers to maintain confidentiality in the face of
potential corporate wrongdoing).
61 Under the proposed rules, if a lawyer is not satisfied
by the client’s response to her determination that the client
is acting improperly, the lawyer must withdraw and report that
withdrawal to the S.E.C.. Faced with the threat of noisy




In mandating its new lawyer obligations, the Sarbanes-
Oxley proposals effectively called for a change in the
relationship between lawyers and clients – or at least a
dramatic expansion in the lawyer’s gatekeeper role.60 When
lawyers have information that fits within the proposed
regulation’s ambit, they may – and sometime even must – use it
to blackmail clients into complying with the lawyers’ view of
appropriate conduct.61 This, in turn, creates new incentives
for clients not to share information with their lawyers.
This essay need not detail how directly this framework
contradicts the traditional state view of lawyer partisanship
and the importance of confidentiality. The S.E.C. and state
models cannot happily co-exist, at least with respect to
corporate and securities lawyers. The new approach clients
take to their securities lawyers may affect their approaches
to their lawyers in other aspects of practice as well – both
state and federal in nature. 
III. THE TREND TOWARD FEDERALIZATION
21
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62 See Bruce A. Green and Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating
Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 390-400,
418-23 (describing the historical preference and reasons for
state regulation of even federal lawyers).
63 See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 375 (discussing the
argument that local professional regulation of lawyers
“accounts for local characteristics and concerns”) and
authorities cited therein.
64 See id. at 373 (analyzing the argument that respecting
state professional regulation “enables the states to serve as
laboratories for novel approaches”) and authorities cited
therein.
65 Id. 345-57. Indeed, the globalization of practice may
create additional pressures for federal regulation, because in
some instances only the federal government can adopt the type
of regulation (e.g., by treaty) that responds to international
concerns. This, for example, helps explain federal
participation in regulations relating to lawyer participation
in money laundering that potentially facilitates international
terrorism. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
66 A single lawyer may be governed by the professional
rules in the state or states in which they are licensed,
20
At a simpler level, the new federal regulations may
simply represent one aspect of a developing struggle for power
over professional regulation (i.e., as a whole) between states
and the federal government. The rationale for deference to
state regulation is largely historical in nature; states
traditionally have provided the laboring oar in regulating
lawyers.62 Arguably, local rules can be tailored to the
demographics of the local bar63 and states should be allowed to
experiment with differing rules as a means of avoiding
stagnant, uniform regulation.64
Changes in legal practice over the past several decades,
however, militate in favor of increasing federalization of
professional regulation. As I have detailed elsewhere,
practice has become more nationalized – both in the sense of
lawyers practicing in multiple jurisdictions and in the sense
of legal matters crossing state borders.65 It is becoming ever
more difficult for lawyers to understand and follow the
requirements of multiple jurisdictions66 and for individual
22
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states in which they consult with clients, a state in which a
case is filed, and separate states in which a case requires
them to engage in legal activities.
67 For example, states must take into account the
requirements of other states that have an interest in a
lawyer’s activities. Because of the nationalization of
practice, an increased number of lawyers not licensed by a
particular state also are likely to engage in practice
activities within the jurisdiction, making detection and
enforcement of code violations problematic.
68 See supra text accompanying note 25. It is important to
note that even the Thornburgh memorandum limited its
preemptive claim to the activities of federal prosecutors. It
did not address traditional regulation of civil lawyers or
state prosecutors.
69 For example, the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley
regulation affects the requirements of state rules like Model
Rule 1.3 and state confidentiality rules as they apply in the
securities context. But the regulations do not purport to
establish a national standard governing these issues outside
the securities context.
21
states to regulate particular instances of practice.67 These
changes support the adoption of a uniform body of professional
regulation.
At first glance, the recent federal regulations simply
seem like a first step in that direction. With the possible
exception of the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, however, they are
a peculiar first step if their goal is to unify and
nationalize the regulation of the profession as a whole. Each
of the regulations is confined to an extremely narrow and
specific aspect of legal practice. They leave the general role
of lawyers and the control of state professional rules intact
with respect to most legal representation. Indeed, with the
exception of the federal response to state no-contact rules,68
none of the federal regulations directly overrules state rules
or attempts to moderate the effect of inconsistent approaches
by different jurisdictions.69
IV. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEXTS OR
AMONG SPECIALIZED AREAS OF PRACTICE
One can conceptualize many of the recent regulatory
23
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70 Commentators frequently have noted the paradigm of the
criminal lawyer. See, e.g., Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of
the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 548 (“the
[criminal] defense lawyer is commonly regarded as the
archetype of the advocate in the adversary system”). Some
commentators have suggested that civil attorneys should be
regulated, or should practice, differently. See, e.g., Robert
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11
(1988) (suggesting that the consensus in favor of civil
lawyering that follows the criminal paradigm has evaporated);
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 Hum. Rts. 1, 12 (1975) (accepting different behavior
from criminal defense lawyers because of the “special needs of
the accused”); cf. Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal
Distinction in Professional Responsibility, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 165, 166 (1996) (questioning the criminal paradigm) and
authorities cited at 166 nns. 5-7.
71 See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical
Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169, 186-209 (analyzing the
possibility of writing professional rules targeted to
particular types of representation) and authorities cited
therein.
72 See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN AND ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 68 (2d ed. 2002) (noting the “constitutional
dimensions” of client autonomy and attorney-client
22
changes as outgrowths of one of two emerging views of
professional responsibility regulation: (1) that traditional
regulation based on the paradigm of unsophisticated individual
criminal defense clients should be tempered in civil
representation;70 and (2) that legal ethics codes are flawed in
their failure to include nuanced professional rules that
target issues arising in particular specialized areas of
practice.71
Consider, for example, the federal efforts to modify
traditional state regulation regarding practice in the
criminal context. The states’ traditions, of course, are to
emphasize loyalty and fierce partisanship on the part of
criminal defense attorneys and to impose limits on
prosecutors’ ability to interfere with defendants’ attorney-
client relationships. These traditions are borne, in part, of
constitutional concerns.72 The strength of commentators’
24
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confidentiality).
73 See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 202-05 (1988)
(noting the claim that superaggressive lawyer practice is
justified primarily in the criminal context); Jay S. Silver,
Professionalism and the Hidden Assault on the Adversarial
Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 863-67 (1994) (justifying
superaggressive lawyer behavior, but arguing that one must
distinguish the criminal and civil contexts); William Simon,
The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993)
(suggesting that even proponents of less partisan lawyering
“concede that the standard adversary ethic may be viable” in
the criminal context).
74 See e.g., Tom Watson, Thornburgh Memo Has Defense Bar
Up in Arms, MANHATTAN LAWYER, Oct. 3, 1989, at 4 (noting a
defense lawyer‘s characterization of the Thornburgh memorandum
as a "declaration of war on the defense bar"); Monroe
Freedman, Dirty Pool in the Prosecutor's Office, TEXAS LAWYER,
Oct. 1, 1990, at 26 (citing approvingly an A.B.A. resolution
that “opposes any attempt by the Department of Justice
unilaterally to exempt its attorneys from the ethical rules
that apply to all attorneys”); Fred Strasser, Thornburgh
Exemption Is Rebuked; Direct Contact, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL,
June 10, 1991, at 3 (noting defense attorneys’ criticism of
the “arrogance of the U.S. government”); Judge Raps AG for
“Arrogation of Power,” LEGAL TIMES, June 10, 1991, at 1 (citing
a federal district court’s characterization of the Thornburgh
memorandum as “nothing less than a frontal assault on the
legitimate powers of the court” and “a serious threat to the
integrity of criminal justice proceedings in federal courts”);
Daniel Klaidman, Clinton Is Asked To Intervene on Rules
Regarding Suspect Interviews; ABA, Defense Bar Want Delay in
Codifying 'Thornburgh Memo', THE RECORDER, Dec. 23, 1992, at 1
((quoting New Mexico district judge Burciaga’s statement that
“[b]ecause this memorandum invites continuing unethical
23
support for traditional state rules typically has varied
proportionally to whether the commentators have focused on the
criminal or civil contexts.73 
Of all the modern federal reforms, the efforts of the
U.S. Department of Justice to preempt protections for criminal
defendants’ attorney-clients relationships have met the most
effective resistance. The Thornburgh memorandum was reviled.74
25
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behavior, it must not be tolerated”); Marianne LaVelle,
Prosecutors' Plan To Bypass Counsel Fans Corporate Ire, THE
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 11, 1993, at 17 (noting claims by
members of the defense bar that the Reno Rule constituted
“poorly conceived regulations” which failed to implement
“respect for the rule of law”).
75 The Thornburgh memorandum sought to preempt all state
professional rules governing D.O.J. attorneys and the Reno
Rule initially proposed a regulation establishing a virtually
unlimited pre-indictment right of D.O.J. lawyers to contact
unrepresented parties. See Proposed Justice Department Rule on
Communications with Represented Persons, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,976
(July 26, 1993) (detailing the early history of the proposed
rule). The Justice Department subsequently withdrew the
proposed regulation to allow for a more open comment period.
See Proposed Justice Department Rule on Communications with
Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,086 (March 3, 1994)
(detailing the history of the proposal). It then adopted a
more moderate regulation that reiterated its authority to
preempt state ethics rules but limited the situations in which
it would do so. See supra text accompanying note 27; see also
Burke, supra note 51, at 1650-61 (arguing that the final Reno
Rule represents a "compromise" concerning the exercise of
D.O.J. authority).
76 The McDade Amendment, formally known as the Citizens
Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §530B (2000), provided that
attorneys for the federal government are subject to ethical
standards in state “laws and rules.”
77 In In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000), for example,
federal prosecutors in Oregon unsuccessfully argued that they
were exempt from state rules forbidding lawyers to engage in
“deceit”, despite the mandate of the McDade Amendment. 
24
The Reno Rule backtracked significantly from the federal
government’s initial position.75 Advocates of state regulation
ultimately won the day through adoption of the McDade
Amendment.76 And courts have resisted subsequent efforts by
federal prosecutors to avoid state ethics requirements.77
The federal reform efforts on the civil side, in
contrast, have met less resistance – at least less successful
resistance. The Kaye Scholer law firm ultimately caved to the
26
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78 See supra text accompanying note 15.
79 See William H. Simon, Further Thoughts on Kaye Scholer,
23 LAW & SOC. INQ. 365 (1998) (noting that other participants in
a panel analyzing the government’s regulation in the Kaye,
Scholer case avoided disputing Simon’s justifications because
of their “agreement” that the government’s position was
“plausible prima facie and supported (though not unanimously)
by authority”). The government’s position that lawyers assume
client duty of candor when acting as clients’ agents in
providing information has proven compatible with the lawyer’s
traditional advocate’s role in other contexts. 
80 For example, because of constitutional guarantees
applicable only to criminal defendants.
81 For example, through broad discovery rules,
requirements of candor to tribunals, and previous regulatory
requirements that impose gatekeeper functions on lawyers.
25
Office of Thrift Supervision regulation,78 and that regulation
and other regulations modeled after it have largely been
accepted as well-founded.79 The I.R.S. regulations and the core
regulations promulgated through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have
quickly become entrenched. Arguably, the difference in the
response to the changes in the criminal sphere reflect a
recognition that the criminal paradigm emphasized by state
codes deserves less deference in civil matters. Similarly, the
content of the civil regulations may be evaluated more
sympathetically because observers already have internalized a
notion that extreme partisanship arguably appropriate in
criminal representation80 is less appropriate – and has
sometimes already been modified81 – in the civil context.
Alternatively, one can view the various recent federal
regulations as implementing a broader notion that the states’
unitary model of professional regulation is too monolithic. In
other words, it fails to take into account important
differences inherent in particular areas of practice – not
just the differences between civil and criminal practice. The
work of banking lawyers, tax lawyers, and securities lawyers,
for example, may have peculiar attributes that justify
imposing a higher responsibility to the public on these
lawyers, at least when they are engaged in producing public
27
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82 See Simon, supra note 16, at 255 (“the maximal duty [of
disclosure] seems defensible in the banking context”).
83 See generally Fred C. Zacharias and Bruce A. Green, The
Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000)
(arguing that federal prosecutors are unique in important
respects relevant to professional regulation).
84 For a history of the efforts to enforce rules modeled
after Model Rule 3.8(f), see, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, A
Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of
Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV. 917, 917-25 (1992) and Zacharias,
supra note 23, at 458-61.
85 See supra text accompanying note 55.
86 See, e.g., the remarks by: Senator Michael Enzi, 148
Cong. Rec. S6556 (July 10, 2002) (“ After Enron, it is clear
we need some hard and fast rules, and not just an arcane honor
code rarely adhered to, so the necessary measure of client
duty is placed into the hearts and minds of the legal
profession”); Senator Jon Corzine, 148 Cong. Rec. S6556 (July
10, 2002) (“The bottom line is this. Lawyers can and should
26
filings.82 Likewise, criminal prosecutors may be unique
practitioners who should be governed by specialized rules.83 
These two theoretical perspectives can account for some
of the recent changes, but they are not perfect explanations
for what has transpired in recent years. For example, the
civil-criminal distinction would cause one to have predicted
greater success for state efforts to protect attorney-client
relationships by confining the exercise of federal
prosecutorial subpoena power.84 Yet these efforts, for the most
part, failed. 
Likewise, if the recent federal efforts to regulate
conduct within particular fields of practice were based on an
intention to create nuanced rules governing different
specialties, one would have expected the changes to be
implemented carefully, with a view to how the changes would
affect the outlook and role of lawyers in other fields. That
has not been the case.85 Indeed, the rhetoric supporting
reforms such as Sarbanes-Oxley has flowed in a relatively
angry way against lawyers as a whole. It has not expressed a
narrow view that limited sub-specialties of practice raise
unusual issues.86
28
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play an important role in preventing and addressing corporate
fraud”); Senator John Edwards, 148 Cong. Rec. S5652 (June 18,
2002) (noting that lawyers’ responsibilities to clients are
bounded by the limits of the law, but that some lawyers are
forgetting those limits).
87 See, e.g., Model Rules, Preamble (“To the extent that
lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling,
the occasion for government regulation is obviated”). Of
course, the adoption and administration of state codes
ordinarily are supervised by state supreme courts. However,
the courts typically rely, almost exclusively, on the work of
state bar organizations. 
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Thus, it probably goes too far to identify either the
civil-criminal distinction or the desire for better nuancing
among specializations of law as the root cause of the modern
federal reforms. The reforms and the responses to the reforms
do suggest a wavering, but perhaps growing, taste on the part
of federal rulemakers for the notion that not all areas of
practice should be regulated identically. But this stands in
marked contrast to the impetus for the McDade Amendment, which
in essence reaffirms the authority of states to act as prime
regulators in the more general professional responsibility
field. 
V. THE FAILURE OF STATE REGULATION
There may be a far broader, and more significant,
interpretation of recent developments. In adopting model
ethics codes for adoption by the states, the American Bar
Association membership expressly sought to reserve for lawyers
the process of drafting professional regulation.87 There are
two explanations for this effort – one cynical, one less so.
On the one hand, the A.B.A. may simply have been protecting
the guild. More likely, the code drafters may genuinely have
believed that lawyers best understand how attorneys operate
and need to operate for the system to work efficiently. The
A.B.A. therefore may have taken the position that a body of
lawyers is in the best position to write the rules. Whatever
the reason, the A.B.A. unashamedly expressed its hope that
adoption and implementation of the model codes would fend off
efforts by non-bar affiliated regulatory institutions to
regulate the practice of law.
For a long time, this view has prevailed, though
29
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88 As discussed supra text accompanying note 2, federal
laws always have regulated lawyers’ professional activities to
some extent. See also Green, supra note 2 (discussing how
criminal law regulates lawyers in their professional
activities and affects professional norms).
89 See supra note 54.
90 See, e.g., Kane, note 32, at 17 (arguing that the
“latent message [of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] seems to be: ‘If
you cannot regulate yourselves and abide by the rules you have
crafted, then we (Congress) will do it for you’”); Abraham C.
Reich and Michelle T. Wirtner, What Do You Do When Confronted
with Client Fraud, 12 BUS. L. TODAY 39 (Sept./Oct. 2002)
(discussing Sarbanes-Oxley and stating “Let us be frank about
the situation: the legal profession is in danger of losing its
right of self-governance”); Stephanie R.E. Patterson, Note,
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Eroding the Legal
Profession’s System of Self-Governance?, 7 N.C. BANKING INST.
155, 175 (2003) (concluding from Sarbanes-Oxley that “the
legal profession could be in danger of losing its privilege of
self-regulation”).
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imperfectly.88 Arguably, however, the recent developments
reflect a broad perception that traditional state regulation
of lawyers is failing and that nontraditional regulators
should enter the field. Support for this conclusion is found
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The legislation simply noted
Congress’s displeasure with the inadequacy of existing
regulation of securities lawyers and instructed the S.E.C. to
identify and adopt appropriate regulations.89 The Act, in
short, represented a statement that Congress wished the
federal government to step in to fill a regulatory void.90 The
innovations of the Office of Thrift Supervision, I.R.S., and
Department of Justice can similarly be viewed as the actions
of individual federal agencies that observed the same failure
of state regulation within their narrow spheres.
Of course, it is too early in the cycle of federal
regulation to determine whether the recent developments are
symptomatic of a broad belief that state professional
regulation, as a whole, has failed. Examples of limited
federal regulation of lawyers have long existed, without
leading to an overall invasion of traditional state
30
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91 See supra text accompanying note 9.
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prerogatives.91 At least one recent federal statute undermines
the claim that the local control needs replacement (or
supplementation). In overruling federal agency attempts to
supplant state regulation, the McDade Amendment directly
recognized and enhanced the authority of existing state codes.
 
VI. THE LIMITED FAILURE OF STATE REGULATION
The recent trends might be explained through a related,
but narrower view of the failure of state regulation.
Arguably, proponents of federal regulation remain willing to
accept the general viability of state professional regulation,
but perceive that state regulators have a fundamentally flawed
approach to limited aspects of regulation. Thus, for example,
federal regulators may believe that states overemphasize the
notion of partisanship by lawyers or the importance of
attorney-client confidentiality, but that states deserve
deference with respect to most other foci of professional
regulation. Under this view, federal institutions should be
prepared to supplant or supplement state regulation within the
narrow areas in which state regulators fail, but should leave
the bulk of state regulation intact.
This approach helps explain such developments as the
Sarbanes-Oxley, Office of Thrift Supervision, and Justice
Department regulations. Each of these reflects a sense that
state regulation overemphasizes lawyer alliance with client
interests in a way that fails to acknowledge countervailing
societal interests: accurate disclosures in the securities and
banking fields, and criminal law enforcement. The federal
regulations, however, are tailored to that failing, rather
than attempting to supplant state regulation as a whole.
In one sense, this explanation seems unsatisfying. The
federal regulations in question actually do little to correct
the alleged flaw in state approaches, because the regulations
limit themselves to conduct by federal lawyers engaging in
narrow aspects of federal practice. They do not address the
underlying deficiency in the state approach – for example, an
overemphasis on partisanship – as it applies to lawyer
practice more generally. Thus, it seems unfair to characterize
the actions of the federal agencies as implementing a
conclusion that outside regulation is necessary to remedy an
institutional failing of state control of lawyers.
On the other hand, the limitations of the actions which
the federal agencies have taken do flow naturally from the
31
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92 See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 337 (noting that
Congress has constitutional authority to nationalize
professional regulation governing lawyers).
93 That is, state rules governing lawyers for corporations
modeled after Model Rule 1.13.
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limitations on the agencies’ own authority to act. Presumably,
Congress could adopt broad legislation preempting particular
aspects of state professional regulation,92 but individual
federal agencies cannot. By exercising the legitimate
authority that they do have, the federal agencies arguably are
using their regulatory power as a bully pulpit. As more
federal regulations focus on the same aspects of lawyer
practice and preempt the traditional state approaches to those
aspects of practice in limited spheres, states may need to
revisit their general approaches. Alternatively, to the extent
state regulators decline to do so, lawyers practicing in the
fields of the federal regulations will need to internalize and
reconcile the multiple roles prescribed for them. The
difficulty in doing so may, in and of itself, induce pressures
for reform at the state level.
VII. NO CHANGE AT ALL
The simplest explanation for the modern federal
developments is that they reflect nothing significant. In
other words, no global changes in professional regulation or
in the interaction between state and federal institutions has
occurred, 
or is occurring. The bar has overreacted to routine, limited
federal regulation and incorrectly has perceived it to be
symptomatic of some broad trend.
The Sarbanes-Oxley proposals, for example, can be viewed
as very modest. They simply adopt typical state rules
governing corporate counsel in the federal arena93 and give
them slightly more teeth by elevating lawyers’ duty to take
remedial measures from permissive to mandatory. Had the S.E.C.
adopted the noisy withdrawal proposal, that might have been a
significant change, but the S.E.C. did not. 
There are other examples in which commentators may have
exaggerated the extent of federal changes. Had the Thornburgh
memorandum been implemented fully, for example, it might have
had a dramatic effect on traditional state regulation. But,
like the Sarbanes-Oxley proposals, it too was moderated. More
poignantly, the Office of Thrift Supervision regulation that
32
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94 In hindsight, what proved most problematic about the
Kaye, Scholer case was not O.T.S.’s regulation itself, but
rather the heavy-handed way in which O.T.S. enforced it. See,
e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1122, 1189 n.36 (noting the pressure exerted by
the government that induced settlement in Kaye, Scholer);
Simon, supra note 79, at 365, 367-68 (noting that “obsession”
of commentators on the freezing of assets in the Kaye, Scholer
case).
95 Thus, for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the FATF
proposals alerted the bar to deep public concerns about
continuing lawyer involvement in client wrongdoing. The
response of the A.B.A. Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and
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gave rise to the Kaye, Scholer case arguably was entirely
consistent with traditional state regulation. Nothing in state
codes eliminates the status of lawyers as client agents,
charged with the clients’ responsibilities when they act in
the clients’ stead.94 Finally, if the McDade Amendment proves
nothing else, it establishes that strong sentiment in favor of
traditional state regulation continues to exist among federal
regulators.
VIII. A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION
The best explanation for the recent events may be an
amalgam of the different explanations offered above. The
federal developments have changed traditional professional
regulation in limited ways. They suggest perceived flaws in
both narrow and broad aspects of the role that state
regulation prescribes for lawyers. And they do emphasize the
existence of federal power in the legal ethics arena and the
need for more particularized regulation. Yet in avoiding
wholesale revamping of traditional regulation, the federal
actions seem more like an invitation to negotiate about
professional responsibility regulation than an effort to
supplant the existing regime.
Negotiation, of course, can take many forms other than
direct talks about a specific course of conduct. It may
consist of lobbying in the context of proposed legislation or
regulation. It may reflect action, counter-action, and
compromise. It may involve submitting a dispute to a neutral
arbitrator, such as the courts. Or it may simply take the form
of parallel proceedings by governmental and bar institutions
that serve to mutually educate the institutions.95
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the Profession, stating strong advance opposition to “any law
or regulation that . . . [would] compromise the lawyer-client
relationship or the independence of the bar,” highlighted the
bar’s concerns. A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE
PROFESSION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (approved by the A.B.A.
House of Delegates, Feb. 2003). Having alerted one another to,
and educated one another about, the underlying differences in
outlook, the relevant actors, if they wish, are now in a
position to reduce the conflict and to address both sets of
concerns constructively. 
96 Thornburgh memorandum, supra note 25.
97 See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State
Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies over
the Anti-contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291,
311-15, 333-57, 371-85 (1992) (discussing undervalued
prosecutorial interests underlying the no-contacts and grand
jury subpoena rules and criticizing the bar's position);
Green, supra note 22 (questioning the D.O.J.'s
"confrontational attitude" with respect to Model Rule 4.2);
Nancy J. Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare Between Prosecutors
and Defense Attorneys: A Plea for an End to the Current
Hostilities, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 515 (1992) (discussing and
criticizing “warfare” between the D.O.J. and the A.B.A.
regarding Rules 3.8(f) and 4.2); Zacharias, supra note 84, at
944-51 (criticizing the Bar's unilateral position in 3.8(f)
and identifying possible alternative reforms); Zacharias,
supra note 22, at 289-91 (questioning both sides' one-sided
positions with respect to 3.8(f)).
98 See, e.g., United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (holding that the Thornburgh Memorandum did not
constitute preemptive federal “law”); Whitehouse v. United
States District Court, 53 F. 3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995)
(upholding a federal district court's adoption of a state
anti-subpoena rule with respect to trial subpoenas but not
with respect to grand jury subpoenas); United States v. Lopez,
4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 106 F.3d 309, (9th
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The Department of Justice’s response to A.B.A. and state
efforts to adopt attorney-subpoena and no-contact rules,96 for
example, produced heated public dialogue,97 followed by
judicial and legislative intervention,98 followed by
34
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Cir. Cal. 1997) (requiring prosecutorial compliance with
California’s no-contacts rule); Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd.,
975 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting a district court's
authority to adopt a state rule limiting grand jury
subpoenas), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993); United States
v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir.) (interpreting the no-
contacts rule as not applying to investigative stages), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); Kolibash v. Committee on Legal
Ethics, 872 F.2d 571, 575 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that the
Supremacy Clause may bar state enforcement of state's anti-
subpoena rule against federal prosecutors); In re Doe, 801 F.
Supp. 478, 485 (D.N.M. 1992) (rejecting a prosecutor’s
Supremacy Clause argument). The cases were followed by
Congress’s adoption of the McDade amendment, which ratified
the application of state rules to professional prosecutors.
Citizens Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §530B (2000); see also
Subcomm. on Gov't Information, Justice, Agriculture, House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, Federal Prosecutorial Authority in
a Changing Legal Environment: More Attention Required, H.R.
Rep. No. 986, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 32 (1990) ("We disagree
with the Attorney General's attempts to exempt departmental
attorneys from compliance with the ethical requirements
adopted by the State bars to which they belong and in the
rules of the Federal Courts before which they appear"). 
99 The A.B.A. Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility removed its proposal to clarify
Model Rule 4.2 from the calendar of the A.B.A. House of
Delegates’ August 1994 calendar meeting because the U.S.
Department of Justice asked to comment on the proposal.
Proposal to Amend Rule 4.2 is Taken Off ABA Calendar, 10
ABA/BNA LAWS. MAN. ON PROF’L CONDUCT 161 (June 15, 1994). The
Committee subsequently amended its proposed comment to Rule
4.2 to address the concerns that D.O.J. raised. ABA Groups
Submit Proposals to Change Three Model Rules, 11 ABA/BNA LAWS.
MAN. ON PROF’L CONDUCT 149-150 (May 31, 1995). In later years, a
D.O.J. attorney was appointed to the ABA’s Ethics 2000
Committee, which was charged with deciding whether substantial
changes should be made to the Model Rules. Model Rules –
“Ethics 2000”Committee, 13 ABA/BNA LAWS. MAN. ON PROF’L CONDUCT
168 (June 11, 1997). The Ethics Committee and the Ethics 2000
33
compromises by the A.B.A. in its drafting process (to give
prosecutors a voice)99 and compromises by the Department in its
35
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Commission both held extensive discussions with D.O.J. before
recommending substantial amendments to the text and comment of
Model Rule 4.2. Model Rules: ABA Ethics Groups Recommend
Changes to Model Rule on Ex Parte Communications, 15 ABA/BNA
LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT 347 (July 21, 1999). Proposed
amendments to Model Rule 4.2 were withdrawn specifically in
response to the Department’s objections to the original
wording. ABA Annual Meeting, Regulation of Bar: ABA Refuses to
Change Ethics Rules Unless Studies of MDPs Dispel Concerns, 15
ABA/BNA LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT 399 (August 18, 1999). 
The State Conference of Chief Justices and the D.O.J.
also engaged in separate, direct talks. See Pierce, supra note
49, at 125 n.6 (“The Chief Justices' Discussion Draft was the
result of negotiations between the Chief Justices' Special
Committee on Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct . . . and the D.O.J.”) (citing Memorandum from Special
Comm. on Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct to
Members of the Conference of Chief Justices (Dec. 19, 1997)).
100 In addition to compromising on the general preemption
issues and the scope of D.O.J.’s preemption of state no-
contact rules, see supra note 75, the Reno Rule appeared to
accept the A.B.A.’s 1995 moderation of the attorney-subpoena
rules. See supra note 21. The D.O.J. subsequently has worked
with the A.B.A., the Conference of Chief Justices, and the
Federal Judicial Conference in exploring regulatory and
legislative solutions to its concerns about the substance of
individual rules and about the effect of disuniformity in
state professional regulation upon federal prosecutors.
101 See Proposed Rule, supra note 31, discussed supra text
accompanying note 30-33.
102 See, e.g., Final Rule, supra note 33, Executive
Summary at *7 (“Accordingly, we are extending the comment
period on the ‘noisy withdrawal’ and related provisions of the
proposed rule and are issuing a separate release soliciting
comment on this issue”).
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position.100 Likewise, the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations began
with an extreme proposal101 that prompted comment, public
outcry, and then a compromise by the S.E.C. that invited
further comment and dialogue in anticipation of further
rulemaking by both the S.E.C. and the states.102
A more interesting example is the Office of Thrift
36
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103 A.B.A. Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Resp. and
Section of Criminal Justice, Report to the House of Delegates
5 (Feb. 1990) (arguing that attorney subpoenas “pos[e] ‘one of
the single greatest threats to the defense bar and to
defendants' ability to obtain criminal representation’”),
quoting ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON THE ISSUANCE
OF SUBPOENAS IN CRIMINAL CASES BY STATE AND FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 1 (July
1985)); Bettina Lawton Alexander, et al., Protecting Yourself
and Your Firm in the Representation of Insured Depository
Institutions: Lessons to be Learned from the Kaye, Scholer
Case, C873 ALI-ABA 299, 310 (1993) (“One of the most
disturbing things about the Kaye, Scholer C&D is the fact that
certain of its terms seem to impose duties and standards that
35
Supervision’s conduct in the Kaye Scholer case. After the
public outcry and O.T.S.’s success in recouping a substantial
sum from the Kaye Scholer law firm, one might have expected
two results: (1) that O.T.S. would pursue other firms
vigorously, and (2) that firms would seek to litigate O.T.S.’s
authority to force them to adopt roles antagonistic to their
clients. What actually has occurred is a form of equipoise.
Few, if any, enforcement actions or challenges have been
publicized. Lawyers appear to have incorporated the
specialized rules into the more general partisan role that
they continue to implement in other contexts. In exchange,
O.T.S. appears to have recognized the dangers of
overemphasizing its power to make and enforce its rules.
What these examples suggest is that the sky is not
falling, but neither is the status quo unchanged. The force of
traditional state regulation continues, but lawyers and state
regulators have had to recognize limits to the traditions.
Similarly, the federal government has identified areas
requiring change, but has not done so in an unyielding
fashion. As the number of federal reforms increases, the
invitation to state regulators to reconsider and negotiate
traditional approaches inevitably will become more
significant.
IX. CONCLUSION 
Whenever the bar or other commentators criticize
developments in professional regulation, it is important to
place those criticisms in context. The tendency of critics is
to decry any change in the status quo as undermining
tradition.103 Reforms typically are characterized as precursors
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are inconsistent with, and in some cases perhaps contradictory
to, the established ethical obligations of lawyers”); Lawrence
G. Baxter, Fiduciary Duties in Federal Banking Regulation, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1993) (arguing that the O.T.S. in Kaye,
Scholer introduced a “novel” fiduciary duty); Anthony E.
Davis, Professional Responsibility: Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9, 2002, at 3 (arguing that the
proposed S.E.C. Rule would “undermine state regulation”);
Keith R. Fisher, Neither Evaders nor Apologists: A Reply to
Professor Simon, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 341, 344 (1998)
(“[O.T.S.]seemed to be announcing, albeit in a rather indirect
fashion, new standards of attorney conduct and responsibility
that constituted a significant departure from professional
norms theretofore (and, for the most part, still) extant”);
Guy Harrison, Protecting Our Profession, 65 TEX. B.J. 678
(2002) (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act threatens “bedrock
principles” of the legal profession).
104 Keith R. Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor’s Toesies:
A “Roguish” Concurrence with Professor Baxter, L534 ALI-ABA
397, 400, 407-410 (1993) (arguing that O.T.S.’s standards
undermine effective lawyering); William J. Genego, The New
Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 816-17 (1988) (arguing that
the threat of attorney subpoenas by prosecutors might well
drive criminal defense lawyers from practice); Loomis, supra
note 32, at 1 (reporting the claim that the S.E.C. is “bound
and determined to take advantage of a windfall opportunity to
make marionettes out of the lawyers”); cf. John C. Coffee,
Myth & Reality: SEC’s Proposed Attorney Standards, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 16, 2003, p.5 (characterizing bar association criticisms
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as showing “Chicken Little has never
been more adamant that the sky is falling”).
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of dramatic upheaval in professional regulation as a whole.104
The recent federal reforms have been somewhat unusual in
their number. With the benefit of the calm that accompanies
hindsight, it is fair to conclude that none of the reforms,
individually, eviscerate states’ traditional ability to
regulate the practice of law. Taken together, however, they
may signify trends that will continue in the future. 
This essay has attempted to identify the list of possible
trends which the recent reforms might represent. Commentators
– mostly academics – have presented theories about core issues
in professional regulation and predictions about the future of
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professional regulation which some or all of the federal
reforms fit. Only by placing the federal reforms in the
context of these broader themes can we begin to evaluate their
actual and potential significance.
This essay has concluded that no single explanation for
the reforms is possible. The reforms do not neatly fit a
uniform pattern that reflects an overarching change in
regulatory approaches or in society’s attitudes towards the
relative merits of state and federal regulation. They do,
however, suggest a series of questions about traditional
regulation that the federal actors have opened for discussion.
The best view of recent events is that they have begun a
process of negotiation with respect to particular substantive
issues, potential new approaches, and the relative competence
of different institutions to regulate different aspects of
legal practice. Federal regulators are only likely to impose
their will in unilateral fashion if the bar and state
regulators limit themselves to wringing their hands about
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